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When one coin on to the end of a graduate program and 
the completion of a dissertation, there are many persons to 
whom a debt of gratitude is owed. To all those who guided 
me in ray graduate courses and who assisted me with this 

t am particularly indobted to Dr. Frederick Hartmann. 
Hot only did Dr. Hartmann stimulate my interest in the field 
of international relations, but he also directed my attention 
to the subject of peace-keeping groups. His perceptive 
comments and constant encouragement have been invaluable to 
this study. I am deeply grateful for his generous assistance. 
My thanks go too to Dr. Arnold Heidenheimer for his 

gestions in connection with this study. I wish to express 
as well my gratitude to Dr. Manning Dauor for his assistance 

crises with dispatch and kindness. 

I would like to thank the University of Florida for 
the financial aid which made possible my graduate studies 
and the preparation of this dissertation. X am grateful to 
the staff of the library of tbo Univorsity of Florida for its 



. ■ THU( il ■ ■ iAN ZAE10K IN 










Honey: the financial bsae 52 

notarial: the logistic bane 56 

The legal statue of the Truoe Supervision 
Organ! to tion . . 

The Truoe Supervision Organisation in Action 

The role of the Truce Supervision 


Organisation for action . . 

The functioning of the observers 




Conditions for Creation of UNOGIL. 

Lebanon. . . 

The United Nations involvement. ..... 

The precedents for peace-keeping 

The Establishment of the Observation Group . 

The establishment 

The legal foundations 

The mandate 

Characteristics of UNOGIL. 

Leadership of UNOGIL. 
Support for UNOGIL. . 


Money: the financial base of UNOGIIi. . 
Material: the logistic base of UNOGIL. 

The legal status of UNOGIL 

UNOGIIi in Action 

The organisation of UNOGIIi. 
The functioning of UNOGIIi . 










The Growth of UNOGIL : The 

2. The Scope of Observational Activity by 

UNOGIL from June through Ootober, 1958 138 

3. Source of Troops for OHUC 297 

Record of Critical Votes in the Security 
Council on the Establishment and Support of 

Peace-Keeping Groups 

Selected Critical Votes in the General 
Assembly on the Establishment and Support of 

Peace-Eeeping Groups 

The Rational Composition of URTSO 

The Rational Composition of UHOGIL. 





B-4. The Rational Composition of OEUC at Selected 

Times 461 

B-5. The Rational Composition of the United 

Rations Force in Cyprus (URFIOIP) ....... 463 

keeping Expenses and^ 




1. Organisation oliort or United Nations Truco 

Supervision Organisation 

2. Organisation chart or United Notions 

responsibilities over time . . 

4 , Organisation chart of United Rations 





The blue berets of the Unitea Nations military men 
who do not fight norve eo a symbol of the world' a concern 
for peace. In mid-196d the "blue berets" watched over the 
peace of the world in remote and scattered areas: in the 
hot deserts of Sinai and the Gasa Strip; in mountainous and 
barren 'femes; in the borderland of Kashmir; in the lovely, 
troubled isle of Cyprus. In the past they have served in 
Greece, Indonesia, Lebanon, the Congo, and West New Guinea. 

In this study it is proposed to examine the develop- 
ment and use by the United Nations of the military presence 
as an instrument of pacific settlement. The non-fighting 
force, 1 as wo will term the military presence, is an inter- 
national military contingent which is neither equipped for 
real hostilities nor intended really to fight. Called into 
being not for purposes of collective security, but for those 
of paciTic settlement, it is injected into a situation of 
tension, instability, and potential violence to prevent or 

o the military forces, 
in The United. Nations 

It represents in tangible form the concern 
community that righting be prevented. It n 

because of wbnt it represents. 

The non-fighting force is one of the most significant 
innovations in the realm of pacific settlement made by the 
United nations. It is both e reflection of the challenges 
which have confronted that body and a commentary on United 

which the United Nations hae had to cope has boon a complex 
and difficult one. Problems ore many and hardly made more 
simple by the setting within which they occur: one of a 
world ooraplloated by its division into conflicting power 
blocs} by the recent rise of a number of turbulent, dis- 
contented, nawly-independent states; and by the awesome 

ir of nuclear weapons. In this difficult a 
uneasy world outbreaks of violence have been frequent, 
particularly in the areas j u s t emerging from colonial stat 
The solutions to the problems causing the violence are not 
easy to find. In most oases the issues hove not been blac 

or white — noithor the identity of one "aggressor," who 
might bo dealt with handily by sanctions, nor just and 
aocoptable solutions have alwaya bean clearly evident. Yet 
for the United Nations to do nothing in a crisis merely 

for financing tie force were laid and its functions defined. 
The nations contributing the men were to supply their con- 
tingents with equipment, pay their regular salaries, and 
advance funds for their transportation and maintenance, ill 

in their home state would he repaid by the League, with re- 
imbursement of the League by Poland and Lithuania. This 
project was abandoned, however, before it could come to 
fruition when it became apparent that it could be executed 
only with great difficulty. There was too much opposition 
and too little real support for the League action. Poland 
and Lithuania accepted in theory the idea of the plebiscite 
guaranteed by an international force, but in practice co- 
operated but little. Opposition by the Soviet Union may 
have delivered the final blow to the plan, for the states 
contributing to the force were not anxious to send their 
troops in when a neighboring great power objected. 

The second effort to establish* an international force, 
again to maintain conditions for a fair plebiscite, was more 
successful. In 1934 the League Council created an inter- 
national force whioh operated with Frenoh and German consent 
to ensure order before, during, and after the Saar plebiscite. 

^William Frye , A United Nations Peace Force (Hew 
York: Oceana for The Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1957), p. 50. 

Colombian settlement of Letitia, the League Council resolved 
the issue by placing Letitia under the administration of a 
League Commission for one year. The Commission was assisted 
by an "international force." The international force was, 
in fact, composed only of Colombian soldiers deputised by 
the League of Nations and wearing speoial arm-bands. 

early In the history or the Un i tod Notions. Tho larger 

fall In tho middle. At the far end or tho ranee would bo 
the small armies established by the United Nations to keep 
the peace. Some characteristics common to all these groups 

in the United Nations was one in which righting had occurred 
and was liable to break out again; in which emotions over 
the issues were high and agreement not readily reached, 
flost involved nations which had gained their independence 
since the Second World War. The purpose or the observers 
was to quiet the situation not through forceful means — for 
they were few in number and unarmed — but through tho moral 
and psychological effect conveyed by their presence. The 
purpose and means of the peace-keeping force were similar 
to those of the observers though a limited use of arms was 
possible to them. 

The small observer groups might be considered as the 
prototype or the military presence. The small observer 
group technique has been uaed by the United Nations in three 
situations; in Greece from 194U to 1954 ; in Indonesia from 
1947 to 1951; and in Kashmir from 19«9 to the present. In 
Groeee observation was carried out along a 500 mile border 
by between 30 end 40 

military observers operating 

personnel , 

, as welt os the equipment necessary 
for the mission at the outset,^ come from eight, states — 
Australia, Brasil, China, Prance, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States — all or which 
wore members of the Special Committee on the Balkans. in 
Indonesia approximately Sfl observers served, selected from 
the same countries that were members of the Consular 
Commission: Australia, Belgium, China, France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. In Kashmir, observers have 
been on duty since early 19" 9 to aid in maintaining the 
cease-fire between India and Pakistan. The observers have 
numbered about sixty over the years. The initial seconding 
states were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, 

were under the direction, at least initially, of the special 

..'•'■i'll Committee 
sum largo enough to cover 
Secre tary-G en oral 
response. m ’ — 1 

budgets did includ 

^Pakistan w 
on tho Balkans, bu. 
the Spocial Committee w 

ixt General Assembly so 
appropriation to cover 

a Special Committee 

esumably they might also have participated i 
oup's activity. This might b — ' • 
N. Doc. A/57" , p. 2. 

Observation Mission In Yemen. Those groups have been con- 
siderably larger enfl mere expensive than the prototype 
observer teams. They hove ranged in else from 200 bo 600 
men and have been supplied with a substantial amount or 
communications and reconnaissance equipment. Their mission 
is correspondingly expanded. It may include investigation 
as well as observation. World opinion may be mobilised to 
supplement the observer presence as a deterrent to aggres- 
sion. Such groups move the United Nations a step closer to 
use of a full-fledged military force. Both the Palestine 
and Lebanon endeavors were ambitious enough to qualify as 
miniature armed forces. Their experience is directly rele- 
vant to the emergence of the technique of the peace-keeping 

This emergence 

L-fledged military force 
the United Nations Emergency 

crisis in 1956. It was followed by the United Nations Force 
in the Congo, created in I960 and ranging in size from 
15,000 to 20,000 men, and the Force in Cyprus, set up in 
1969 and numbering about 7,000. These forces represent the 
furthest extension of the United Nations development of 
peace-keeping techniques. Not only were they far larger in 
size and more expensive than the observer groups, but they 
also had somewhat brooder powers at their disposal. Although 


in theory and in moot cases the powers of the peace-keeping 
.force are only slightly greater than those of the observer 
group, in practice considerably greater powers have been 
exercised at times, particularly by the Force in the Congo. 

This study will examine comparatively and in depth 
the non-fighting force technique as utilised in four cases: 
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in 
Palestine, the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon, 
the United Nations Emergency Force, and the United Nations 
Force in the Congo. Reference will be made as well to the 
recent uses of this technique in Yemen and Cyprus. 

There are striking differences in the characteristics 

of these four groups: 

differences first in the else of the 

contingents, which range from the 689 man maximum of the 
Palestine group to the 19,707 man maximum foroe used in the 
Congo; differences too in the situation which called the 
units into being. In Palestine the organisation was there 
primarily to maintain a truce imposed on Jews and Arabs by 
the United Nations. In Lebanon the organisation was 
stationed at Lebanese borders to observe and stop infiltra- 
tion from without by spotting it. In Sue* the force was to 
stabilise the international relationships of the states in- 
volved by making possible the withdrawal of British, French, 
and Israeli forces from Egypt and ensuring against a re- 
sumption of hostilities between Egypt and Israel. In the 


Congo the Unload Nations Force was bo help establish 
internal order in the newly independent nation, thereby 
bringing about the withdrawal of Belgian forces brought in 

intervention of outside powers, and aiding the Congo to 
become a viable state. Both the Lebanese and Congo situations 
were complicated by overtones of civil war. 

Despite the admittedly significant differences be- 
tween the groups, they can be considered as a unit because 
of all they shore. All are composed of military man; all 
are used in situations of tension, instability, actual or 
potential fighting. All initially have a common purpose, to 
promote peaceful settlement by curbing violence through the 
effect of their organised and disciplined presence os repre- 
sentatives of the United Nations. Although they may be 
armed, they are backed by the prestige and power of the 
organisation rather than primarily by the power of weapons. 

At the same time, the discipline of the personnel makes them 
capable of quick and effective response on behalf of the 
organisation within a context where the use of force is or 
may become prevalent. 

•Phe study is divided into two main parts. In the 
first section oase studies of the four peace-keeping groups 
are presented. In each case an examination is undertaken of 
the origins, characteristics, and operation of the group. 

Political, leg'll, financial, awl administrative factors are 
taken into account. An effort has been made to make each of 
the cases parallel the others as cloeely as possible in 
order to facilitate generalisation. The second part of the 
study is devoted to an analysis of the technique of the 
non-fighting force, based on the material developed in the 
case studies. 

The objectives of this analysis of the non-fighting 
force technique as an instrument of peaceful settlement are 
two-fold. The first aim is to determine the nature of the 

instrument which has been developed. We are particularly 
concerned with the degree to which an institutionalised 
technique, readily available in recognizable form for use 
in crises, has emerged and the degree to which each force 
is unique. Going beyond the question of extent of institu- 
tionalization is that of the reasons and significance of 
the institutionalization which has occurred. The analysis 

peaceful settlement leads m 
second central purpose of t 
performance and potential o 

fighting force a 
hypothesized on 

0 or less directly to the 

1 study: the evaluation of t 
the non-fighting force. Th 
ie effectiveness of the non- 

te experience thus far wit! 
evaluation, first, of the 

3-fitting fore 

unenthusiastically receivod and so emasculated as to be 
transformed into a resolution to establish a small field 
service. Not much was said about non-fighting forces in the 
early 1950 's, perhaps because fighting forces were still too 
much in the forefront. Prom 1956 forward, however, under 
the impetus of the successes of the United Nations Emergency 

steadily, seriously, and at times with impressive origins. 

In general, those proposals have originated less often with 
members of the United Nations Secretariat than with indi- 
vidual statesmen. United Nations delegations, Governments, 
and non-governmental organizations . One of the most per- 
sistent advocates of some sort of permanent force has been 
Lester Pearson of Canada; among the most influential advocates 
were Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. 

In the face of these efforts to make more and more 
extensive use of the non-fighting force as an arm of the 
United Nations, it seems that it is time to evaluate on the 
basis of past experience the merits and usefulness of the 
non-fighting force. 





In Palestine in May, 19'i8, violent fighting erupted 
between Israeli and Arab. A truce supervision organization, 
created by the United Nations to help still that violence, 
stands as one of the pioneering ventures in the field of 
peacekeeping through the, use of the military man in a 
non-fighting capacity. 

la the first decade of the United Nations there were 
other uses of military observers — in Greece, in Indonesia, 
in Kashmir, for example. Yet the Truce Supervision Organi- 
zation in Palestine differs from these truce observation 
teams. The difference lies primarily in the extensiveness 
and scope of the operation, but this difference is so great 

In Palestine the Truce Supervision Organization 
reached a total size of over 600 men and had at its dispo- 
sal twelve airplanes, 150 jeeps and trucks, and four ships 
with their crews. It had extensive communications equipment 


and its own communications Bystetn, lb was, In short, almost 
a little army — albeit a little army without guns.^ 

Many of the rudiments of the military force are found 
in the Palestine group. In the problems faced and solved, 
in the accumulation of precedents and personnel experienced 
in the use of the military, there are links, direct as well 
as indirect, between the Palestine experience and the later 
use of the non-fighting force in more ambitious endeavors. 
The Palestine venture moves the United Nations a step for- 

ward in the employment of the non-fighting force bo carry 
through its objectives. 

To fully understand the place of the United Hatlons 
Truce Supervision Organisation in the development of the 
non-fighting force os a technique of pacific settlement, il- 
ls necessary to briefly review the history of the Organisa- 
tion: its origins, characteristics, and functioning. 

Conditions for Creation of the Truce Organisation 

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation 

of the Truce Organist 
Ralph Bunc'he , Acting Mediator, 

international C 
said that the operation b. 
* diplomatic and a 

h United Nations Headquarters. General Assembly, 

ing (November , p. 609. See 

(UNTSO) was designed to aymbolisio 
United Nations concern that righting l 

fashion the 
halted in Palestine, 
o the problems at 

issue. In other problem areas fighting had occurred w 
out evoking such a strong United Nations response. Wh 
were the conditions which led to the use in this case 
a contingent of military men to represent the United N 

Organization into existence. First, the United Nations 
had special responsibilities with respect to the Palestine 
problem stemming from its prior involvement in the situation 
coupled with its failure either to find a solutioa ac- 
ceptable to ail parties or to win agreement of the United 
Nations members to the imposition of a solution. Second, 
the fact of open and heavy fighting between Jew and Arab 
in the Holy Land made apparent the urgent need for 6ome 
sort of action. Finally, the variety of solutions and the 
proposals for a United Nations enforced peace put forth in 
early 1948 as well as the tentative experimentation with a 

establishment of a peace-keeping group to quell the vio- 
lence and to facilitate the search for a permanent solution. 


United nations involvement with Palestine dates from 
the spring of 1947 when the United Kingdom, despairing of 

Arab hostility to the plan and the announced unwillingness 
of Britain, the mandatory power, to cooperate in implementing 
a plan unaooeptable to either of the principals. 

a 2he plan was based on the majority recommendations 
of the eleven member United Nations Special Committee on 
Palestine, set up in the spring of 1947 by a Special Session 
of the General Assembly to make recommendations on Palestine. 
She majority plan was recommended by Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay. A three- 
nation minority of India, Iran, and Yugoslavia recommended a 

abstained. For the report of the Committee see u!n. Doc. 

ably and 

The precedents 


The United Hattons could hardly ignore a situation 
becoming ever more violent with which it was directly in- 
volved. Proposals, plans, and limited measures of United 
Nations peace-keeping tumbled one after another between 
November, 19'*7, and Nay, 1978 . Although these proposals 
set few concrete precedents for the Truce Supervision 
Organization, they probably contributed to creation of an 
atmosphere conducive to decisive action ultimately by the 
United Nations. 

The General Assembly had made virtually no initial 
provision for implementation of the partition decision 
beyond setting up a five-nation Palestine Commission to 
administer the territory in the interim period between the 
Nandatory Power's departure and the establishment of the 
Arab and Israeli states. The Security Council was in- 
structed to give all necessary aid and guidance to the 
Commission and to take the neoessary measures for implemen- 
tation of the plan. It was Boon apparent that the Commis- 
sion would need help to fulfill its mission. Two major 
efforts in the spring of 1978 to provide such assistance 
can be delineated: the call for a force for Palestine and 
the establishment of a truce commission. 

In January and February, 1978, both Secretary-General 
Trygve Lie and the Palestine Commission struggled with the 


double problem of executing the partition decision and of 
smothering the violence already aflame in the Holy Lend. 
Both put forward, more or less openly, proposals for 
forceful action by the United Hations. The proposals were 
received with little enthusiasm and less action. 

The Secretary-Goncral , who "put the full weight of 
(his) office consistently behind the organisation's de- 
cision from the time it was first taken," took two 
approaches.-* On the one hand, he quietly set in motion 
Secretariat studies of the possibilities of creating an 
international police force and inaugurated exploratory 
conversations with some of the smaller nations on their 
willingness to supply a force to execute the Palestine 
decisions. On the other hand, in public statements he 
tried to impress the Security Council members with their 
responsibility for enforcing the resolution. 

The Palestine Commission was more direct in its 
proposals. The Commission found it impossible to assume 
its responsibilities due to violence in Palestine and a 
lack of cooperation by Britain, the mandatory power. It 
therefore confronted the Security Council with a special 
report in which it contended that an armed force was neces- 
sary to bring an end to fighting in Palestine and to enable 

Kacmillan^Company,*!'^'*;, p. ltd. 



Security Council authority to use force to cope with 
threats to and breschos of the peace did not extend to the 
use of such force to implement a recommendation by the 
General Assembly. In the race of doubts on the legal 
soundness of the forceful action and the unwillingness of 
the major powers to alienate either side, the practical 
problem of where to get troops for a force loomed large. 

Yet, the report of the Palestine Commission was not 
without significance. It triggered reconsideration of the 
entire Palestine issue, first in the Security Council from 
February through April, 19'i8; then in the Second Special 
Session of the General Assembly, meeting from April 16 to 
May 14, 1948. The search for on alternative political 
solution to partition was not fruitful.^ Reconsideration 
did lead, however, to a separation of the problems of 
fighting and of the future of Palestine. As it became in- 
creasingly apparent that a political solution would not be 
found quickly or easily and as the fighting intensified, 
efforts were concentrated on halting the Arab-Israeli 

'The United States delegation raised t 
of a temporary trusteeship for Palestine and 
willingness to supply some soldiers for the p 
lishing such a trusteeship. The idea was not 
majority of the United Rations members h 

i possibility 


The Security Council attempted to quiet t 
situation through a series of cease-fire calls, 
April 1 through the end of May, and by creation 
Commission. The cease-fire resolutions called i 

the Palestine 

Ln varying 
May 29 

resolution ell were virtually ignored. Yet the Security 
Council activity in the period prior bo the effective truce 
had an influence on the truce which was finally established 
and on the organisation set up to maintain it. 

Establishment of the Truce Commission can be singled 
out as of particular importance to later developments. The 
Commission was created by a resolution of April 23 to assist 
the Security Council in implementing the cease-fire calls 
and to report to the Council on the situation in Palestine. 
The experience of the Truce Commission revealed the need for 
an expanded truce supervisory organisation, thereby stimu- 
lating the creation of such an organisation. It also pro- 
vided a formula for determining the national composition 
of the organisation, once established. (By suggestion of 
the United States, the Commission was composed of repre- 
sentatives of the members of the Seourity Council that had 
consular representatives in Jerusalem with the exception of 
Syria, Under this formula the Commission was composed of 
representatives of the United States, Belgium, and France. 

^ u The justification for this method of selection was 

attention to the problem of truce supervision with requests 
for more assistance. First, in connection with a proposal 
to demilitarise Jerusalem, the Commission queried the 
Security Council in early May on the possibility of obtain- 
ing a fifty-man force to provide the guarantees necessary 
to both sides if the truce were to be upheld. Seoond, in 
a cable of May 21 the Commission indicated its need Tor a 
small body of competent military observers to assist it in 
carrying through its functions. In the same cable the 
Commission expressed the conviction that the only effective 
means to bring a cessation of hostilities was through 
employment of a neutral force, sufficiently large and 
powerful to impose its will on one or both parties, created 
under Article '11 or Article 42 of the Charter. 11 The 

that use of representatives already in Palestine would be 
a prompt, effective, and simple way of providing the Se- 
curity Council with on arm in Palestine to report to it and 
to help execute its decisions. Significantly, in tho light 
of later developments, objections to this method of selec- 
tion were voiced by the delegates of the Soviet Union and of 
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, both of whom ab- 
stained on the resolution establishing the Commission. 
Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 287th meeting 
ox io ~ m & 


ii; Some delegates 
ing^ officers into Pale 

source of oontrol offi. 
was too dangerous. Ih 
since no functions of , 

assigned t 

decide that the Commission, created f 
should now undertake control, and nolice 
", Official *-■ *— - 

•d not 

Ssff V'Si’iS !:;°S ’xr a5 ‘" u: 

vhe ending of the British mandate, and the invasion of Arab 

tive from July 18, 1948. Although the truce was replaced 
in August, 1949, by an armistice based on agreements between 
Israel and Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria respectively, a 

the parties to maintain the armistice and to ensure obser- 

The lirst Truce a 
eral Assembly resolut 

Kay 15 

resolution of Play 29. 

foundation provided 

Trues Supervision Organisation by the Assembly and the 
Council was skeletal. Neither the resolutions themselves 
nor the debate accompanying them laid down precise guide- 
lines as to what the Organization was to be. The unwilling- 
ness of the United Nations members to draw definitive lines 
for the truce group suggests a resistance to heavy involve- 
ment and limits to support for the truce. 

The General Assembly resolution called for a truce 
and established a mediator, to be selected by a committee 
of the General Assembly — the committee designated was com- 

The Mediator's principal functions wore to arrange a truce 
in Palestine and to promote a peaceful settlement between 
Arabs and Jews. The provision which provided the basis for 
a truce organization merely stated "that the Secretary- 
General shall provide the Mediator with an adequate staff." 1 ** 
The Security Council resolution was also vague on 
details of the Truce Organization. Its provisions instruc- 
ted the Mediator, in cooperation with the Truce Commission, 

of military observers should bo provided. That was all. 

‘Vne May 15, 19A8, General Assembly resolution was 
resolution 186 (S-II). The Security Council resolution was 
passed at the 510th meeting of the Council and can be found 

^General Assembly resolution 186 (S-II). 


Supervision Organi- 

sation was almost non-existent. The General Assembly 
resolution which established the position of Mediator had 
received little discussion before passage. The resolution 
was proposed by the United States in a sub-commission set up 
originally to consider a provisional regime for Palestine, 
but diverted in the face of fighting (and inability to agree 
on any provisional regime) to the problem of v 
Holy band. The Mediator proposal was put fort 
the next to last day of the Special Session, w 
statement that despite its late introduction, 
represented, not something new, but merely the 
views which had been expressed in the sub-committee. The 
discussion of the resolution in the plenary session centered 
on whether the position of Mediator should be established at 
all, not on the proper scope of responsibilities of the 

n May 15, 

e provision 


Debate in the Security Council did little more to 
clarify the role and nature of the proposed Truce Organisa- 
tion. At the time of passage of the May 29 resolution 

attention was focused not on the role c 
Truce Organisation but on the question 

The extent of unwillingness of 

of whether mediation 
ic Security Council 

commit itself 

Organisation is suggested by 


the failure of any Security Council members bo come forth 
with substantive suggestions at a session of the Council 
convened for the express purpose of formulating instructions 
for the Mediator in establishing the Truce Organisation. 

The French delegate apparently expressed the view of the 
Council when he suggested that confidence along with wide 
powers to implement the resolution should be given the 
Mediator. 1 -* 

The votes in the General Assembly and Security 
Council on the truce resolutions suggest substantial support 
for the truce and its organisation. The vote on the May 14 
General Assembly resolution establishing the truce was 51 in 
favor, 7 against, and 16 abstentions. 1 *’ The opposition came 
from the Communist bloo nations and Cuba. The expressed 
reason for Soviet disfavor was that the truce operation 
represented a Western maneuver to prevent partition from 
becoming effective. 1 ^ That Soviet opposition was designed 

‘■'•’Security Council, Official Records . 3rd Tear, 313th 
meeting (June 3, 1940), p. so. 

16 The states which abstained wore the Arab members of 
the United nations, joined by some Latin American states and 
Australia, Siam, and Greece. General Assembly, Official 
Records , Pud Special Session, 135th plenary mooting (May 14, 
194577pp. ^44 -4 3. Soo Appendix A for a complete listing 

^Xn fact, the opposition bo the Truce Supervision 
Organisation fits the pattern of Soviet thinking about the 
United Nations during this period, with its general hos- 
tility to any sort of United Nations police system on the 
basis it infringed national sovereignty and its insistence 


merely to voice disapproval and not to kill all action is 
suggested by the fact that the Soviet Union and the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic abstained on the criti- 
cal votes in the Security Council. 

T he legal foundations 

The legal foundation for the establishment and 
functioning of the Truce Supervision Organisation rested on 
the General Assembly resolution of May It, 1948, and the 
Security Counoil resolutions of May 29 and July 15, 1948. 

The authority under which the position of the Mediator was 
created and an organization to aid him authorized was not 
specified in the resolution. However, there was no chal- 
lenge raised as to the power of the General Assembly to 
create a subsidiary organ under Article 22 of the Charter 
to assist it in performing its functions. 

More question could be raised os to the provisions of 
the Charter under which the Security Council called for on 
end to hostilities. The Security Council calls for a cease- 
fire prior to the May 29 call had been clearly taken under 
Chapter VI of the Charter. Apparently the May 29 and July 
15 cease-fire resolutions were also taken under Chapter VI, 

on the veto and on keeping Important decisions in the Se- 
curity Council whore they were subject to the veto. For 
further discussion of the Soviet position see Alexander 
Dali in ^ The Soviet Unlonat the United Nations (New York! 


but each made reference to Chapter VII and seemed to move 
progressively closer to actual invocation of enforcement 

In the debate in the Security Council on the May 29 
resolution two schools of thought emerged. One, including 
tbe Soviet Union and the United States among its proponents, 
called for action under the enforcement provisions of 
Chapter VII, apparently feeling that stronger action than 
had been taken in the post was necessaxv.^ The other 
school of opinion, including among its adherents Belgium 
and Britain, called for action under Chapter VI, viewing 
invocation of Chapter VII os a serious and uncertain step. 
There was feeling that invocation of Chapter VII without 
assurance of effective application of measures of coercion 
and without knowledge of all the potential consequences of 
such action was a serious step, not to be lightly taken. ^ 

The May 29 resolution did refer to Chapter VII, how- 
ever, and the July 19 resolution made even greater use of 
that section of the Charter. In the July 19 resolution the 
parties were for the first time ordered to comply with the 
measures specified by the Council under Article 40 of the 

For the Soviet statement see Security Council, 
Official Records . 3rd Year, 509th meeting (May 29, 1948), p. 
23 For the United States statement see Security Council, 
Official Records . 3rd Year, 308th meeting (May 28, 1948), pp. 


^Security Council. Official Records. 3rd Year. 309th 
meeting (May 29, 1948), pp. 10-14. 

Charter. Article AO refers to provisional measures 

under Article 42, Nonetheless, the reference to action 
under Chapter VII was potentially significant. In theory 
at least such a resolution opened the way to forceful action 
hy the United Nations in the event of failure by the parties 
to comply with the cease-fire order or of truce violations. 
In fact, however, strong action was not taken by the United 
Nations when truce violations of a serious nature did occur. 
Although some question remains as to the precise provisions 
of the Charter under which the United Nations was acting, 
it would appear that the potential authority embodied in 
the July 15 resolution was greater than the authority 
actually invoked under that resolution. It may be suggested 
that political rather than legal factors explain the limited 
response of the United Nations to some serious breeches of 

The mandate 

The truce supervisors' mandate was based on the May 
29 and July 15 resolutions calling for a truce and on the 
terms of the truce itself. The resolutions and the debate 
accompanying them provided only the most general guidelines 

under which they were to operate. The resolutions called 


for an end fco hostilities, banned the introduction of mili- 
tary men or materials into the belligerent area, and 
enjoined the protection of Holy Places and shrinos. None 
of the resolutions specified precisely what the role of the 
observers was to be in ensuring that the truce terms would 
be carried through. It was left largely to the Mediator to 
spell out the role of the truce observers — the responsi- 
bilities they should bear and the policies they should 
follow in meeting these responsibilities. 

The mandate of the observers, as defined by the 
Mediator on the basis of the relevant resolutions, limited 
the role the observers could play in the Palestine crisis. 
It is true, however, that the Mediator initially interpre- 
ted the responsibilities of the observers in relatively 
broad fashion. Their primary purpose, in his view, was to 
prevent a renewal of large-scale fighting during the truce 
and to preserve the equitability of the truce. The phrase 
"to prevent" might have opened the door to a widening of 
the authority of the observers. The door which was opened 
was quickly slammed shut. Potential disagreement among the 
members on the preventive functions of the observers was 
forestalled by the Secretary-General ' s firm declaration 
that the Truce Supervision Organisation had no preventive 

authority and could not taka any preventive measures in 
advance. 2 ® 

Moreover, the conditions under which the observers 
were to function were narrowly drawn. First, the observer 
was to be "completely objective in his attitude and judg- 
ment" and to "maintain a thorough neutrality as regards 
political issues in the Palestine situation." 21 Such a 
requirement was probably necessary for success in a delicate 
mission. Second, the power available to the observer to 
meet his responsibilities was quite limited. He had, for 
example, no enforcement power and was denied arms of any 
sort. The decision on arms was made by the Mediator. That 
it corresponded with the desires of a majority of member 
states was indicated by the rejection by the members of later 
efforts of the Mediator to broaden the powers of a few of the 
observers by arming them for especially difficult tasks. 
Although the invocation of Chapter VX2 of the Charter in the 
July 15 cease-fire call might have justified such a broaden- 
ing of the observers' mandate, no effort was made to use 
the resolution for this purpose. 

•M. Bloomfield, Egypt. Israel 
(Toronto: The Carswell Company, Ltd., 
21 U.H. Doc. S/928, p. 1. 

19577 ; 



Tile creation of a non-fighting military unit to help 
restore and maintain peace represents only the first stage 
of United Nations action in a crisis. The group must not 
only he created! it must also operate effectively in the 
field to achieve its objectives. It may be suggested that 
the ability of the group to carry through its charge will 
depend on the balance of the equation of its responsibili- 
ties and its powers. Intimately related to the power of 
the force are the characteristics of the force itself. 

Three aspects of the force seem particularly relevant to 
the determination of its effectiveness: a) its leadership: 
b) its size and character; and c) its support at head- 
quarters and in the field. Support in turn takes several 
forms. At United Nations headquarters it oan be read in 
terms of votes, finances, logistics, and manpower. In the 
field cooperation and non-cooperation are indicative of the 
attitude of those with whom the force deals. 


The Security Council resolution calling for establish- 
ment of a mediator to supervise the truce provided that he 
should be appointed by the permanent members of the Security 
Council. On the advice of Secretary-General Trygve Lie the 
permanent members selected Count Polke Bernadotte of Sweden 


Bernadotbe served as Mediator until 

assassination by Jewish terrorists in September, 1948. At 
that time the Secretary-General appointed Bernodotte's 
principal assistant. Dr. Ralph Bundle, as Acting Mediator.®* 
The Mediator was vested with both great powers and 
great responsibilities in the creation of a truce super- 
vision organization. With few precedents to follow and 
little guidance from the Security Council or the Assembly, 
the Mediator made the crucial decisions which gave shape and 
form to the Truce Organization and, incidentally, set a 
pattern for the future. According to the United States 
representative on the Security Council, the Truce Organiza- 
tion was not the product of the Council or the Assembly but 
of the Mediator who had built it from the staff of the Truce 
Commission and the staff assembled by the Secretary-General.^ 
However, it would be misleading to suggest that the 
Mediator was unfettered in his determinations regarding the 
shape and character of the Truce Organization. In fact, the 
Truce Supervision Organization seems to have evolved from a 
mix of the Mediator's decisions, the situation itself, and 

*^It slight be noted that although the resolution calls 
for selection of the Mediator by the permanent members of 
the Security Council, Buncbe served as Acting Mediator for 
nearly a year on the basis of the appointment by the Secre- 
tary-General. The appointment was ratified by the Security 
Council . 

^Security Council, Official Records . 4th Year, 437th 
meeting (August 11, 19*9) , P- 7. 

the influence of the Secretariat and of certain of the 
national delegations, particularly the United States. 

The relationship between the Mediator and the 
Secretary-General appears to have been one of close collabo- 
ration. Although the critical decisions seem to have been 
made by the Mediator, there is evidence that the Secretary- 

General's role in the decision-making process went beyond 
merely implementing the requests of the Mediator. 2<l Several 
things suggest an important part for the Secretary-General 
in the Palestine operation: first, the Secretary-General's 
role in selecting the Mediator, for it was Lie who proposed 
Bernadotte as Mediator and who appointed Bunche Acting 
Mediator; second, the close personal friendship between the 
Secretary-General and both Bernadotte and Bunche; and third, 
the foot of direct and evidently much-used communications 

between Lake Success and the Mediator's headquarters 


What was the relationship of the Mediator to the 
Security Council and particularly to those nations which 
were most concerned with the Palestine question because of 

According to Stephen Schwebol 
effort in Palestine might be classifi' 
headquarters endeavor ' 

e United Nations 

i>j-s Political Powers a— 
University Press, 19pd), 

Mediator and the Secretary- 

.n indispensably interdependent fashion. 

1 f thg Uni ted Nations: 

membership ou the Truce Commission and consequently partici- 
pation in the Truce Supervision Organisation? These 

on the decisions and actions or the Mediator, but they did 
hold an ultimate check, ir his decisions wore not regarded 
favorably, pressures could be exerted to alter them or to 
prevent their implementation. Thus, the Mediator’s de- 
cisions on both the composition and the site of the truce 
group were modified under the pressure of the national 
delegations, acting not openly through Security Council re- 
jection of proposals, but through inaction and behind-the- 
scenes pressures. 

It is not without significance that both Trygve Lie 
and Count Bernadotte were activists, desiring strong United 
Hations action to resolve the Palestine issue. While they 
gave vigorous leadership to the Truce Organisation, their 
more ambitious objectives were curbed by the caution of the 
Security Council. The scope and limits of the Mediator's 
powers will beoome clearer with on examination of the de- 
cisions made on suoh crucial aspects of the truce group as 

Support f 

o organisation . -One a 

significant decisions made with respect t 


Organization regarded its composition. Bernadotte s 
thought was that the Truce Organization should he compos 

Council. Accordingly, on Kay JO, the Hediator contacted 
the French, British, American, and Soviet military attac 

tribute to a truce control organization. Within days th 

e Truce Commission, that is, the United 

Bernadotte suggested another reason for changing the b 

ai) Acoo-rd<ng to Bernadotte on June 2 the American charge 
d'affaires, calling to inform him unofficially^that the United 

aa a observerB i and n the°necessary staff and aircraft, also sug- 
lolk^Bernadotte , To Jerusalem (London: Hodder and Stoughton,. 
195D, P. *5. 


Whatever the reasons for the change in formula for 
participation, the change did bring the Truce Supervision 
Organization in line with a kind of rough rule-of-thumb 

the most convenient national representatives (i.e. those 
with some prior involvement with the question or area). 

cinate in the Truce Organization had two limitations. First, 

^Security Council, Official Records , 3rd fear, 
meeting (July 13, 19*8), pT*T.